Fundamentals of culpability and the biologist debate on free will: is Criminal Law being tested, or is it an interdisciplinary false problem?

Abstract

Scientists like Robert Sapolsky have questioned the foundations of criminal law, envisioning its overcoming in light of the hypothesis that human acts are biologically predetermined. This seeks to respond to such claims based on the principles of culpability and the reasons for punishment, analyzing the meaning or dimension of free will relevant to the right to punish. The dichotomies of culpability and punishment; dangerousness and security measures, in the evolution of penal ideas, as well as the importance of self-determination for the theory of crime, notably in the development of the concept of culpability, are recalled. The obstacles that Sapolsky poses to free will and his proposals for a new criminal justice system are synthesized. His ideas are confronted with other perspectives, in the field of neuroscience, on the role of consciousness in determining acts and the effectiveness of punishment as a tool for social control. Therefore, considering that for the reproach of the responsible individuals, the external conditions of their acts matter more, and that awareness of the consequences of these acts, including the punishment, influences the determination (even if biological) of the will, it is demonstrated the minimal importance of the debate on free will for criminal law, concluding that such a question does not shake its foundations.